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CASE NOTES
EVIDENCE-ADMISSION OF GRUESOME AND SHOCKING
PHOTOGRAPHS OF VICTIM AT MURDER TRIAL
HELD REVERSIBLE ERROR
During the course of an argument which erupted subsequent to a dis-
cussion of their financial problems, defendant struck his wife, and beat
her with a hammer. Their small daughter, hearing the commotion, at-
tempted to intercede whereupon defendant proceeded to beat them both
* unconscious. Then the defendant went upstairs to the second floor, got a
hunting knife and returned to the basement whereupon he slashed his wife
and daughter to death. Defendant was convicted in the trial court of
murder in the first degree' and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of Indiana reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial
on the grounds that it was prejudicial error to admit into evidence grue-
some and shocking photographs,2 one showing the hands and instruments
of a surgeon inside the chest of deceased during the autopsy, the other
showing additional incisions and stitches on the body of deceased made
by the surgeon in performing the autopsy. Kiefer v. State, 153 N.E. 2d
899 (Ind., 1958).
Thus, the Indiana court followed a growing trend in the reversal of
convictions obtained in homicide cases where gruesome and shocking
photographs of the victim were admitted into evidence at the trial level.3
There is ample authority for the general proposition that where photo-
graphs of a victim, or parts of a victim, are otherwise properly admitted
and have a reasonable tendency to prove or disprove some material fact
in issue, or shed light upon some material inquiry, they are admissible in
evidence even though they portray a gruesome spectacle and may tend
to arouse passion and resentment against the defendant in the mind of the
jury; such admission into evidence is a matter of discretion for the trial
court and the determination will not be overruled except in a clear case of
' The indictment was for the death of the wife only.
2 The State introduced a number of other photographs, whose admission into evi-
dence was upheld, that portrayed the nude, slashed body of defendant's wife lying in
the basement at the scene of the occurrence. Also introduced and admitted as a part
of the res gestae was a photograph of the body of the little girl as it appeared in the
basement at the scene; on it could be seen the large knife wounds about the face and
body.
3 State v. Bischert, 131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969 (1957); People v. Jackson, 9 Ill.2d
484, 138 N.E.2d 528 (1956); People v. Bums, 109 Cal.2d 524, 241 P.2d 308 (1952); Craft
v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 700, 229 S.W.2d 465 (1950); McKee v. State, 33 Ala. App.
171, 31 So.2d 656 (1947).
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abuse.4 Further, photographs are not necessarily rendered inadmissible be-
cause the facts thereby shown are cumulative or have been admitted by
the defendant.5
The most common reasons for the introduction of such photographs
into evidence are to show the nature and location of the injury,6 to indi-
cate the position of the body,7 to refute the defendant's plea of self-
defense," and to identify or aid in the identification of the victim.9 The
significant test, then, for the admission of a photograph as an exhibit is its
relevancy. 'If it tends to prove a material fact or is offered within the
frame of reference of a contested issue it is admissible, notwithstanding
any grisly or shocking aspects which it may also contain. 10 Where the
accused claimed he struck the victim a light blow on the head to prevent
his partner from shooting him, a photograph of the victim's skull, from
which the skin and flesh had been removed and which showed a large,
jagged hole and numerous radiating cracks, was admitted as indicative of
the force with which the blow was struck.11
4 State v. Nyland, 47 Wash.2d 240, 287 P.2d 345 (1955); State v. DeZeler, 230 Minn.
39, 41 N.W. 313 (1950); Hancock v. State, 209 Miss. 523, 47 So.2d 833 (1950); Hampton
v. State, 148 Neb. 547, 28 N.W.2d 322 (1947); Potts v. People, 114 Colo. 253, 158 P.2d
739 (1945); Rowe v. State, 243 Ala. 618, 11 So.2d 749 (1943); Russell v. State, 196 Ga.
275, 26 S.E.2d 528 (1943); Turrell v. State, 221 Ind. 662, 51 N.E.2d 359 (1943); Com-
monwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 48 N.E.2d 630 (1943); Fitzgerald v. Common-
wealth, 290 Ky. 825, 162 S.W.2d 202 (1942); State v. Johnson, 198 La. 195, 3 So.2d 556
(1941); Mardorff v. State, 143 Fla. 64, 196 So. 625 (1940); Nicholas v. State, 182 Ark.
309, 31 S.W.2d 527 (1930); People v. Gomez, 209 Cal. 296, 286 Pac. 998 (1930).
5 Wilson v. State, 31 Ala. App. 21, 11 So.2d 563 (1942); Hawkins v. State, 219 Ind.
116, 37 N.E.2d 79 (1941); State v. Nelson, 162 Ore. 430, 92 P.2d 182 (1939); Common-
wealth v. Yaeger, 329 Pa. 81, 196 A. 827 (1938); People v. Burkhart, 211 Cal. 726, 297
Pac. 11 (1931); Blazka v. State, 105 Neb. 13, 178 N.W. 832 (1920). "[A] colorless admis-
sion by the opponent may sometimes have the effect of depriving the party of the
legitimate moral force of his evidence; furthermore, a judicial admission may be clever-
ly made with grudging limitations or evasions or insinuations (especially in criminal
cases), so as to be technically but practically a waiver of proof. . . ." 9 Wigmore on
Evidence § 2591 (3rd Ed., 1948).
6 Commonwealth v. Earnest, 342 Pa. 544, 21 A.2d 38 (1941); State v. Burrell, 112
N.J.L. 330, 170 A. 843 (1934); Young v. State, 182 Ariz. 298, 299 P. 682 (1931); Nicholas
v. State, 182 Ark. 309, 31 S.W.2d 527 (1930); People v. Coleman, 50 Cal. App.2d 592,
123 P.2d 557 (1942).
7 Robinson v. United States, 63 F.2d 147 (D.D.C., 1933); People v. Jersky, 377 Ill.
261, 36 N.E.2d 347 (1941); People v. Smith, 15 Cal.2d 640, 104 P.2d 510 (1940); State v.
Lantzer, 55 Wyo. 230, 99 P.2d 73 (1940); State v. Hamilton, 340 Mo. 768, 102 S.W.2d
642 (1937).
8 People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); Waters v. Commonwealth,
276 Ky. 315, 124 S.W.2d 97 (1939); Commonwealth v. Peronace, 328 Pa. 86, 195 A. 57
(1937).
9 Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936); State v. Miller, 52
R. I. 440, 161 A. 222 (1932); People v. Northcott, 45 Cal. App. 706, 189 P. 704 (1920).
10 Potts v. People, 114 Colo. 253, 158 P.2d 739 (1945).
11 Hawkins v. State, 219 Ind. 116, 37 N.E.2d 79 (1941).
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In the instant case a number of photographs were exhibited to the jury
which depicted the victim's body at the scene of the occurrence and the
wounds thereon from various angles. The reviewing court upheld the
admission of these photographs as relating to material aspects of the case. 12
But when the purpose of an exhibit is to inflame the mind of the jury
rather than to enlighten the jury as to any fact, it should be excluded. 1 3
In Poe v. Commonwealth,'1 4 the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and
remanded a conviction of voluntary manslaughter (on other grounds). In
referring to the attempted introduction of a photograph of the deceased's
body, the court suggested that the prosecutor be more careful in attempt-
ing to introduce possibly inflammatory evidence unless the need for such
was more clearly shown. Then, in a subsequent opinion sustaining the
conviction obtained at a re-trial,15 where the defendant had interposed the
plea of self-defense and the Commonwealth introduced the photograph to
refute the contention, the court upheld the admission of such evidence
because of its probative value in the light of defendant's plea. It was an
indication that this court possessed a refined sensitivity to the distinction
between academic and material relevancy.
Other jurisdictions have weighed the probative value of the photograph
against its prejudicial effect.' 6 In California,17 a conviction in a prosecu-
tion for murder was reversed on the grounds that it was prejudicial error
to admit photographs showing the surgical incisions on the shaved, severed
head of the victim. In McKee v. State,' the prosecution contended that
the deceased died from a severe blow delivered by the defendant. As evi-
dence of this, a photograph was introduced showing the cut-open body
of the victim and the ruptured spleen. In reversing the trial court, the
Supreme Court of Alabama held this photograph inadmissible because it
not only showed the damaged spleen but also showed the open operation
made by the autopsy surgeon and was of questionable value in solving the
matter in issue:
Where, as in this case, massive mutilation of a body is necessary to expose
such injured organ, fairness to an accused demands that only so much of the
surrounding dissected body area be pictured as is reasonably necessary to
furnish visual aid to the jury in determining the question of facts presented. 19
12Kiefer v. State, 153 N.E.2d 899 (Ind., 1958).
la State v. Bischert, 131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969 (1957).
14 301 S.W.2d 900 (Ky., 1957).
15 Poe v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 199 (Ky., 1958).
16 People v. Burns, 109 Cal.2d 524, 241 P.2d 308 (1952); Craft v. Commonwealth, 312
Ky. 700, 229 S.W.2d 465 (1950); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353
(1949); State v. Morgan, 211 La. 572, 30 So.2d 434 (1947).
7 People v. Redston, 139 Cal. App.2d 485, 293 P.2d 880 (1956).
1833 Ala. App. 171, 31 So.2d 656 (1947). 19 Ibid., at 177 and 661.
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However, in a recent case 20 involving remarkably similar circumstances,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey indicated an unwillingness to employ
similar reasoning and decided the issue on procedural grounds. The de-
fendant was convicted of shooting his wife. On the trial, the state intro-
duced a photograph of the torso of the deceased which showed where
incisions had been made allowing the flesh to be retracted and exposing
the abdominal organs and the inner structure of the chest. The purpose of
this photograph was to show the path of the bullet through the body. The
supreme court held that the photograph was gruesome and sound judicial
discretion dictated its exclusion, but that it was not substantially preju-
dicial so as to require a reversal under the plain error rule.2 1 A contrary
decision which seems to indicate an astute awareness on the part of the
court of the psychological impact of such evidence is People v. Jackson.
22
There, in a prosecution for murder, defendant was convicted of stabbing
the deceased in the chest. The state was permitted to introduce a photo-
graph showing the face and neck of the deceased, taken at the hospital
after the autopsy, in which the autoptic incisions were visible. In reversing
and remanding the case the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
We are unable to say that this inadmissible evidence could not have been
a determining factor in the bringing in of the death penalty for this defendant.
2 3
In the instant case, the state introduced sufficient photographic evidence
to show the nature and location of the wounds, the condition of the body
and its position at the scene of the occurrence, and all other cogent facts.
There seemed to be no reason for introducing the photographs showing
the surgeon's hands in the chest wound and the subsequent surgical in-
cisions other than to inflame the jury. The court in its opinion stated its
position in a very lucid manner:
However, we do not pass upon the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Our
duty is to see that he has a fair trial. Even the perpetrator of a crime as heinous
as that portrayed by the evidence in this case, is entitled to a fair trial and
the protection of his rights as an American citizen. It is with this thought in
mind that we approach the questions presented by this appeal.2 4
20 State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J.L. 45, 138 A.2d 739 (S. Ct., 1958).
21 Defendant's objection in the trial court was insufficient to raise the issue of the in-
flammatory and prejudicial nature of the photographs; the court applied the plain
error rule. N. J. Rev. Stat. (1956) 1:5-1 provides: "The court may, however, notice
plain errors affecting substantial rights of the defendant, although they were not
brought to the attention of the trial court. If it shall appear, after challenge interposed
by the defendant in the appellate court, that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence, the judgment shall be reversed and a new trial ordered."
229 ll.2d 484, 138 N.E.2d 528 (1956).
23 Ibid., at 490, 531.
24 Kiefer v. State, 153 N.E.2d 899 (Ind., 1958) at 899.
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The reasoning employed by some of the courts in this area of the law is
unrealistic and psychologically unsound. Where the state has in some ex-
trinsic manner intensified or exaggerated the grisly aspects of an occur-
rence and attempts to introduce photographs of such conditions to the
prejudice of the defendant, the growing trend is to repulse these efforts.
It would appear to be the more enlightened view.
JOINT TENANCY-COMMON LAW REQUIREMENT OF
FOUR UNITIES HELD NOT NECESSARY TO CREATE
JOINT TENANCY IN STOCK CERTIFICATES
The decedent owned shares of stock in several corporations. In 1948
and 1950, he transferred the shares into his and defendant's name as "joint
tenants with the right of survivorslip and not as tenants in common." The
transfer was accomplished by direct assignment executed in writing on
the back of the stock certificate and signed by the decedent. Plaintiff, the
decedent's widow, sought a declaratory judgment to fix ownership of
these shares in her. Plaintiff contended that her husband had failed to
create a joint tenancy because the common law requisites of unity of time
and unity of title were not present in the transfer. The court of appeals,
per Justice Finnegan, affirmed the decision of the district court holding
for the defendant; and ruled that the transfer did create a valid joint
tenancy, apparently basing its decision on the construction of an Illinois
statute' and the interpretation of a prior Illinois Supreme Court decision.2
Petri v. Rhein, 257 F. 2d 268 (C.A. 7th, 1958).
The issue thus raised by the instant case is whether a joint tenancy in
personal property may be created without first conveying to a strawman3
and then reconveying to the joint tenants.
At common law and in Illinois, a joint tenancy in personal property
was recognized 4 when the unities of time and title were both present.5 A
joint tenancy by operation of law could never be created.6 The unities
were necessary so that both parties could gain equal interests at the same
time. If one merely transferred part of the interest to another, it was con-
1 Il. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 76.
2 Hood v. Commonwealth Trust & Savings Bank, 376 111. 413, 34 N.E.2d 414 (1941).
3 A strawman in the language of real estate brokers is a mere conduit or medium for
the convenience in holding and passing title. Van Raalte v. Epstein, 202 Mo. 173, 99
S.W. 1077 (1906).
4 Re Estate of Jirovec, 285 Ill. App. 499, 2 N.E. 354 (1936); Staples v. Berry, 110 Me.
32, 85 A. 303 (1912); Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 427, 163 N.E. 327 (1928); Case v.
Owen, 139 Ind. 22, 38 N.E. 395 (1894); Neal v. Neal, 194 Ark. 226, 106 S.W.2d 595
(1937).
5 Ibid. 6 Deslauriers v. Senesac, 311 11.437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928).
